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Abstract. In this work, we investigate a security game between an
attacker and a defender, originally proposed in [6]. As is well known,
the combinatorial nature of security games leads to a large cost matrix.
Therefore, computing the value and optimal strategy for the players be-
comes computationally expensive. In this work, we analyze a special class
of zero-sum games in which the payoff matrix has a special structure
which results from the additive property of the utility function. Based
on variational principles, we present structural properties of optimal at-
tacker as well as defender’s strategy. We propose a linear-time algorithm
to compute the value based on the structural properties, which is an
improvement from our previous result in [6], especially in the context of
large-scale zero-sum games.
Keywords: Security Game, Zero-Sum Game, Nash Equilibrium and
Computational Complexity.
1 Introduction
Game theory [2] is a useful tool to model adversarial scenarios. Security games
model attack scenarios wherein an attacker attacks a number of targets while
the defender allocates its resources to protect them to minimize the impact. The
payoff for the attacker and the defender is based on the successfully attacked
and protected targets, respectively. Traditionally, attacker-defender games have
been modeled as zero-sum games, and the resulting saddle-point strategies are
assumed to be optimal for both players. In general, two-player zero-sum game can
be formulated as an linear programming problem [2], and therefore saddle-point
equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. The most efficient running time
of solver for a general LP problem is O(n2.055) [9]. However, solving security
games with more than 2 resources for attacker and defender with a general
LP solver is computationally expensive due to the combinatorial nature of the
problem.
? This work was supported in part by NSF CPS grant ECCS 1739969.
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2 H. Emadi and S. Bhattacharya
In the past two decades, game theory has played an important role in quan-
tifying and anlyzing security in large-scale networked systems. Here, we men-
tion some of these efforts across several applications. In [4], authors propose
an evolutionary game framework that models integrity attacks and defenses in
an Advanced Metering Infrastructure in a smart grid. In [18], a game-theoretic
defense strategy is developed to protect sensor nodes from attacks and to guar-
antee a high level of trustworthiness for sensed data. In [17], authors consider
a security game in power grid in which the utility functions are defined based
on the defender’s net loss, and players’ action set are defined based on different
scenarios such as false data injection to electronic monitoring systems. In [23],
authors provide a game theoretic approach to modeling attack and defense of
smart grid in different layers of power plant, transmission and distribution net-
work. In [8],[5], authors propose a game-theoretic model for the adaptive security
policy and the power consumption in the Internet of Things. In [22], authors pro-
pose a zero-sum game for security-aware sensor placement in which the attacker
minimizes its visibility by attacking certain number of nodes, and the detector
maximizes the visibility of the attack signals by placement of sensors. In [20],
authors consider a cyber-security problem in a networked system as a resilient
graph problem. They use backward induction to obtain optimal strategies for
both players which try to disrupt the communication and maintain the con-
nectivity, respectively. In [20], authors propose a stochastic game-based model
to provide a control synthesis method to minimize deviations from the desired
specification due to adversaries, who has limited capability of observing the con-
troller’s strategy. In [7], authors focus on notions of self-protection (e.g., patch-
ing system vulnerabilities) and self insurance (e.g., having good backups) rather
than only security investments in information security games. [10] introduces
a method for resolving uncertainty in interdependent security scenarios in com-
puter network and information security. In [24], authors examine security game
in which each player collectively minimize the cost of virus spread, and assuring
connectivity. In [11], authors propose a game theoretic framework for picking
vs guessing attacks in the presence of preferences over the secret space, and
they analyse the trade-off between usability and security. In [16], authors intro-
duce a game-theoretic framework for optimal stochastic message authentication,
and they provide guarantees for resource-bounded systems. For a comprehensive
survey of game-theoretic approaches in security and privacy in computer and
communication, a reader could refer to [19].
Security games pose computational challenges in analysis and synthesis of
optimal strategies due to exponential increase in the size of the strategy set
for each player. A class of security games which renders tractable computational
analysis is that of Stackelberg games [1]. In Stackelberg models, the leader moves
first, and the follower observes the leaders strategy before acting. Efforts involv-
ing randomized strategies [12] and approximation algorithms [3] for Stackelberg
game formulation of security games have been proposed to efficiently allocate
multiple resources across multiple assets/targets. In order to extend the efficient
computational techniques for simultaneous move games, efforts have been made
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to characterize conditions under which any Stackelberg strategy is also a NE
strategy [15]. An extensive review of various efforts to characterize and reduce
the computational complexity of Stackelberg games with application in security
can be found in [6], and references therein. Here, we mention a few that are rele-
vant to the problem under consideration. [13] shows that computing the optimal
Stackelberg strategy in security resource allocation game, when attacker attacks
one target, is NP-hard in general. However, when resources are homogeneous
and cardinality of protection set is at most 2, polynomial-time algorithms have
been proposed by the authors. [13] propose an LP formulation similar to Kiek-
intveld’s formulation, and presents a technique to compute the mixed strategies
in polynomial time.
In [14], a security game between an attacker and a defender is modeled as a
non-zero game with multiple attacker resources. The authors analyze the scenario
in which the payoff matrix has an additive structure. They propose an O(m2)
iterative algorithm for computing the mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium where m
is the size of the parameter set. Motivated from [14], in [6], we analyzed a zero-
sum security game with multiple resources for attacker and defender in which
the payoff matrix has an additive structure. Based on combinatorial arguments,
we presented structural properties of the saddle-point strategy of the attacker,
and proposed an O(m2) algorithm to compute the saddle-point equilibrium and
the value of the game, and provided closed-form expressions for both. In this
paper, we show that a zero-sum security game can be reduced to the problem
of minimizing the sum of the k-largest functions over a polyhedral set which
can be computed in linear time [21]. Based on this insight, we use a variational
approach to propose an O(m) algorithm which is the best possible in terms of
the complexity. Moreover, we present structural properties of the saddle-point
strategy of both players, and an explicit expression for the value of the game.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
problem formulation. In Section 3, we present structural properties of the optimal
attacker strategy. In Section 4, we present a linear time algorithm to compute
the value of a large-scale zero-sum game. In Section 5, we present structural
properties of the defender’s optimal strategy, and a dual algorithm to compute
the value and equilibrium. In section 6, we present our conclusions along with
some future work.
2 Problem Formulation: Security Game
Consider a two-person zero-sum game, and let I = {1, . . .m} denotes a set of
targets. We assume an attacker (player 1) chooses ka-targets to attack. So, there
are na =
(
m
ka
)
actions for player 1. On the other hand, protection budget of
targets is limited, and we assume that only kd targets will be protected by the
defender (player 2). So, there are nd =
(
m
kd
)
actions for player 2. The defender has
no knowledge about the targets chosen by player 1. In order to find the optimal
strategy for the players, we formulate a strategic security game (X ,Y, A), where
X and Y denote the action sets for attacker and defender, respectively, and
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card(X ) = na, card(Y) = nd. Every element xi ∈ X represents a set of targets
that are attacked. Similarly, yi ∈ Y represents a protected targets. Each xi ∈ X
and yi ∈ Y is a ka-tuple, and kd-tuple subset of I, respectively.
The attacker has no information about the targets that are protected by the
defender. Let φi denote the cost associated to target i. Moreover, without loss
of generality, we assume that targets are labeled such that φi ≥ φj ≥ 0 for i > j.
We consider an additive property for the utility function i.e., entries of the
cost matrix A are defined as follows:
Aij =
∑
{l|l∈xi∩ycj}
φl. (1)
A represents the game matrix or payoff matrix for player 1. Since we consider a
zero-sum game, the payoff matrix for player 2 is −A. Note that we assume both
players have the complete information of the target costs.
Let p, q be the probability vectors representing the mixed strategies for player
1 and player 2, respectively. The expected utility function is
v = pTAq.
According to the minimax theorem, every finite two-person zero-sum game has
a saddle point with the value, v∗, in mixed strategy p∗ =
[
p∗1, . . . , p
∗
na
]T
for
player 1, and mixed strategy q∗ =
[
q∗1 , . . . , q
∗
nd
]T
for player 2, such that player
1’s average gain is at least v∗ no matter what player 2 does. And player 2’s
average loss is at most v∗ regardless of player 1’s strategy, that is
pTAq∗ ≤ p∗TAq∗ ≤ p∗TAq.
In order to solve every finite matrix game, we can reduce the game to the fol-
lowing LP problem,
maximize
pi
v
subject to v ≤
na∑
i=1
piaij , j = 1, . . . , nd
p1 + · · ·+ pna = 1
pi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , na.
(2)
However, the dimension of the decision variables in the above formulation is
(na + 1) which is exponential in terms of m. In the next section, we present an
equivalent LP formulation with dimension m to compute v∗.
3 Structural Properties of the Attacker’s Strategy
In this section, we investigate the structural properties of the optimal attacker’s
strategy. The value of the game (v∗) can be defined as follows based on the
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attacker’s mixed strategy p:
v∗ = max
p
min
1≤i≤nd
(pTA)i,
where (pTA)i denote the i
th element of pTA. From (1), (pTA)i can be written
in the following form,
(pTA)i =
na∑
j=1
pjaji =
na∑
j=1
pj
∑
l∈xj∩yic
φl =
∑
l∈yci
αlφl,
where,
αj =
∑
{i|j∈xi}
pi =⇒ M[m,ka]p = α, (3)
where α = [α1, . . . , αm]
T , and M[m,ka] ∈ Rm×na is a combinatorial matrix 1.
Since M[m,ka] is a combinatorial matrix,
∑m
i=1 αi = ka. Moreover, in the
following lemma we show that for any feasible α there exists a feasible p. Hence,
the problem reduces to computing α∗.
Lemma 1. M[m,ka] is a surjective mapping.
Proof. Please refer to the Appendix for the proof.
Based on the above lemma, the problem reduces to computing α∗.
Lemma 2. α∗ satisfies the following property:
α∗i φi ≥ α∗jφj for i > j (4)
where α∗j is defined in (3) for p
∗.
Proof. Assume the following holds for α∗:
α∗imφim ≥ · · · ≥ α∗i1φi1 . (5)
Note that v∗ is (m−kd)-sum of smallest αlφl, that is v∗ =
∑im−kd
l=i1
α∗l φl. Assume
that there exist i and j such that α∗i φi < α
∗
jφj for i > j. φi ≥ φj ⇒ α∗j > α∗i .
α∗i < 1, α
∗
j > 0 ⇒ (ei − ej)T∇αv|v∗ ≤ 0. Since v∗ is the maximum value
of the (m − kd)-sum of smallest αlφl, we arrive at a contradiction. Therefore,
α∗i φi ≥ α∗jφj for i > j. uunionsq
Corollary 1. α∗ and v∗ satisfy the following property:
(a) v∗ =
∑m−kd
l=1 α
∗
l φl,
1 A combinatorial matrix M[m,k] ∈ Rm×(
m
k ) is a boolean matrix containing all combi-
nations of k 1’s. Each column of M has k entries equal to 1 and rest of the entries
equal to 0. In other words, M is a matrix constructed from
(
m
k
)
combinations of k
one in an m dimensional vector
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(b) α∗mφm = · · · = α∗sφs > α∗s−1φs−1 ≥ · · · ≥ α∗s−rφs−r, α∗s−r−1 = · · · = α∗1 = 0
for 1 ≤ s ≤ max(ka,m− kd) and 0 ≤ r ≤ s− 1.
Proof. (a) Since v∗ is (m − kd)-sum of smallest αlφl, This property can be
concluded directly from Lemma 2.
(b) Let k denotes max(ka,m − kd). First, we show that there is an optimal
solution such that α∗mφm = · · · = α∗kφk. We proceed the proof by contradiction.
We assume that ∃i ∈ {k+1, . . . ,m} such that α∗i φi > α∗i−1φi−1. Since
∑m
l=1 αl =
ka, there is j ∈ {1, . . . k} such that α∗j < 1. Therefore, (ej − ei)T∇αv|v∗ ≤ 0.
Note that if (ei − ej)T∇αv|v∗ < 0 is a contradiction with the fact that v∗ is
the optimal value, and if (ei − ej)T∇αv|v∗ = 0 then it means there are multiple
solutions which at least one satisfy the property. Moreover, from Lemma 2, if
α∗mφm = α
∗
sφs then α
∗
mφm = · · · = α∗sφs, which completes the proof. uunionsq
Let s∗, r∗ denote the indices for optimal structure expressed in Corollary 1 .
Let Ua and Ud, called active sets of attacker and defender, denote the union of
xi’s and yi’s corresponding to the support sets of p
∗ and q∗, respectively.
Corollary 2. In a security game (X ,Y, A), Ua = {s∗ − r∗, . . . ,m}. When s∗ >
m − kd, the defender has a pure strategy with Ud = {m − kd + 1, . . . ,m}, else
Ud = {s∗, . . . ,m} (for s∗ ≤ m− kd).
Proof. The proof of first part directly follows from the fact that αm, . . . , αs∗−r∗ >
0 and αs∗−r∗−1 = · · · = α1 = 0.
For second part, consider (p∗TA)j . The following condition holds for Ui∗,i∗+r∗ :
αmφm = · · · = αs∗φs∗ > αs∗−1φs∗−1 ≥ · · · ≥ αs∗−r∗φs∗−r∗
αs∗−r∗−1 = · · · = α1 = 0.
When ka + kd ≤ m, (p∗TA)j > v∗ for all j such that {1, . . . , s − 1} 6⊆ ycj .
Consequently,
q∗j = 0 ∀j s.t. {1, . . . , s− 1} 6⊆ ycj ,
else p∗TAq∗ > v∗, which is a contradiction. Therefore, any q∗j corresponding to
yj such that yj ∩ {1, . . . , s− 1} 6= ∅ is zero. In other words, Ud = {s∗, . . . ,m}.
Based on similar arguments, we can conclude that Ud = {s∗, . . . ,m} for
ka+kd > m and s
∗ ≤ m−kd. When ka+kd > m and s∗ > m−kd, (p∗TA)j > v∗
for all j such that {s, . . . ,m} ∩ ycj 6= ∅, and consequently q∗j = 0. Therefore,
q∗j = 0 ∀j s.t. {s, . . . ,m} 6⊆ yj
Since the defender has kd resources, it has a pure strategy to allocate it to targets
{m− kd + 1, . . . ,m}. uunionsq
Remark 1. According to Corollary 2, both players choose mixed strategies that
involve targets with highest impacts (φi).
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4 Computation of v∗
Based on Lemma 2, we can solve the following LP to compute v∗:
maximize
α1,...,αm
m−kd∑
l=1
αlφl
subject to αiφi ≥ αjφj for all i > j
m∑
i=1
αi = ka
αi ≤ 1 i = 1, . . . ,m.
(6)
Note that from Lemma 1, we show that for any α which satisfies the conditions
in (6), there exists a p on a simplex such that Mp = α, which satisfy the
feasibility condition of (6).
From Corollary 1, v∗ and α∗ can be computed by examining all feasible
solutions for 1 ≤ s ≤ k (k = max(ka,m− kd)), and 0 ≤ r ≤ s− 1 which satisfy
the condition in Corollary 1 (b). Let U denote a square matrix of dimension k.
The (i, i + r)th entry of U (denoted by Ui,i+r) is the solution to the following
problem:
maximize
α1,...,αm
m−kd∑
l=1
αlφl
subject to αmφm = · · · = αsφs > αs−1φs−1 ≥ · · · ≥ αs−rφs−r
αs−r−1 = · · · = α1 = 0, s = k − i+ 1
0 ≤ αl ≤ 1,∀l ∈ I.
The following theorem relates v∗ to the elements of U .
Theorem 1. v∗ = max
i,j
{Ui,j}, and the entries of U are as follows:
For i ≤ ka + kd −m:{
Ui,i = 0,
Ui,i+r =
∑m−kd
l=s−r φl when ciφs ≥ ka − r > ciφs−1
For i > ka + kd −m:
Ui,i =
ka(i−k−kd+m)
ci
when ciφs ≥ ka
Ui,i+r =
∑s−1
l=s−r φl +
(ka−r)(i−k−kd+m)
ci
,
when ciφs−r > (i− k − kd +m), and ciφs ≥ ka − r > ciφs−1,
Ui,i+r = (ka − r − ci−1φs)φs−r +
∑s−1
l=s−r+1 φl + (i− k − kd +m)φs
when ciφs−r ≤ (i− k − kd +m) and ciφs ≥ ka − r > ciφs − 1
Ui,i+r = 0 otherwise
where ci =
∑m
j=s
1
φj
.
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Proof. First, we consider the case s ≤ m − kd. Let the optimal solution be
α∗ = (α∗1, . . . , α
∗
m). Since αi = αs(φs/φi) for i ≥ s, δαi = δαs(φs/φi) for
any perturbation δαs. Since
∑
αi = ka, any allowable perturbation around α
∗
satisfies the following condition:
m∑
j=1
δαj = 0 =⇒
s−1∑
j=1
δαj + ciφsδαs = 0, (7)
where ci =
∑m
j=s
1
φj
. Consider a perturbation that involves perturbing αl for
l < s and αs, . . . , αm. From (7), we obtain the following:
δαl = −ciφsδαs (8)
Based on the first order necessary conditions for maxima, we obtain the following:
δv|v∗ < 0 =⇒ φlδαl +
m−kd∑
j=s
φsδαs = φlδαl + φs(m− kd − s+ 1)δαs < 0 (9)
Let g(φ) = −ciφ+(m−kd−s+1). Substituting (8) in (9) leads to the condition
g(φl)δαs < 0. g(φl) > 0 ⇒ δαs < 0 ⇒ ∀j < s, α∗j = 1. If for any l < s,
g(φl) < 0⇒ δαs > 0⇒ α∗s = 1.
As a result, we obtain the following conditions:
α∗j = 1 if g(φj) > 0 (10)
α∗s = 1 if ∃j such that αjg(φj) < 0,
From (10), we conclude that α∗ and v∗ can have the following forms:
1.
αj =

0 j = 1, . . . , s− r − 1
1 j = s− r, . . . , s− 1
ka−r
ciφj
j = s, . . . ,m
(11)
From feasibility conditions in (6) (i.e.
∑m
l=1 αl = ka, αj ≤ 1 and αsφs >
αs−1φs−1), we conclude that at (i, i + r)th entry of U , feasibility condi-
tions are satisfied if ciφs ≥ ka − r > ciφs−1. Substituting (11) in Ui,i+r =∑m−kd
j=1 αjφj leads to the following expression for Ui,i+r:
Ui,i+r =
s−1∑
l=s−r
φl +
(ka − r)(i− k − kd +m)
ci
(12)
2.
αj =

0 j = 1, . . . , s− r − 1
δ j = s− r
1 j = s− r + 1, . . . , s
φs
φj
j = s+ 1, . . . ,m,
(13)
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where δ = (ka−r−ci−1φs), which results from
∑m
j=1 αj = ka. Since 0 < δ ≤
1, 0 < ka − r − ci−1φs ≤ 1, which is equivalent to ciφs ≥ ka − r > ciφs − 1.
Moreover, substituting (13) in Ui,i+r =
∑m−kd
l=1 αlφl leads to the following
expression for v:
Ui,i+r = δφs−r + (i− k − kd +m)φs +
s−1∑
l=s−r+1
φl. (14)
3.
αmφm = · · · = αsφs, αs 6= 0, αj = 0 for j ∈ {1, . . . , s− 1}
Substituting the above condition in Ui,i+r =
∑m−kd
l=1 αlφl, we obtain the
following:
Ui,i+r =
m−kd∑
l=s
αlφl = (i− k − kd +m)αjφj (15)
=⇒ αj = Ui,i+r
(i− k − kd +m)φj , j ∈ {s, . . . ,m} (16)
By substituting (16) into Ui,i+r =
∑m−kd
l=1 αlvl, we obtain the following:
m∑
j=s
Ui,i+r
(i− k − kd +m)φj = ka =⇒ Ui,i+r =
ka(i− k − kd +m)∑m
j=s
1
φj
(17)
Let ci =
∑m
j=s
1
φj
. Next, we have to check whether α satisfies the feasibility
conditions of (6). Substituting Ui,i+r in (16) leads to the following:
αj =
{ ka
φjci
j ∈ {s, . . . ,m}
0 j ∈ {1, . . . , s− 1}
Finally, we consider the case when ka + kd > m. Since Ui,i+r =
∑m−kd
l=s−r αlφl
and αj = 0 for j = 1, . . . ,m− kd, for i = 1, . . . , ka + kd−m, Ui,i = 0. Moreover,
Ui,i+r can be written as Ui,i+r =
∑m−kd
l=s−r αlφl, and the feasible α’s are given as
follows:
αj =

0 j = 1, . . . , s− r − 1
1 j = s− r, . . . , s− 1
ka−r
ciφj
j = s, . . . ,m
(18)
If ciφs ≥ ka − r > ciφs−1, then (i, i + r)th entry of U is feasible. For all i >
ka + kd −m, the arguments are same as for the case ka ≤ m− kd.
Since v∗ is the maximum value which satisfies all feasibility conditions, v∗ is
the maximum entry of U . uunionsq
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Next, we show that U is a sparse matrix, which leads to a linear time al-
gorithm for computing v∗. Let U I and U II be square matrices of dimension k
defined as follows:
U Ii,i+r =
{
Ui,i+r ciφs−r > (i− k − kd +m), ciφs ≥ ka − r > ciφs−1,
0 otherwise
, (19)
U IIi,i+r =
{
Ui,i+r ciφs−r ≤ (i− k − kd +m), ciφs ≥ ka − r > ciφs − 1
0 otherwise
(20)
Lemma 3. Given an infeasible cell in U I , either all the cells to the right (in
the same row) or all the cells below (in the same column) are infeasible.
Proof. Consider an infeasible cell (i, i + r) in U I . For a cell to be infeasible, at
least one of the three inequalities in (19) needs to be violated.
(a) First, consider the case ciφs−1 ≥ ka − r ⇒ ciφs−1 ≥ ka − r′, ∀r′ ≥ r. In
other words, if ciφs−1 ≥ ka − r, there is no feasible solution in (i, i + r′)th
entry of U I for all r′ ≥ r.
(b) Next, consider the case, ka − r > ciφs. Since ci+1φs−1 = ciφs−1 + 1, ka −
r + 1 > ci+1φs−1 ⇒ (i+ 1, i+ r)th entry of U I cannot be feasible. Since i is
arbitrary, we can conclude that (i+ j, i+ r)th entry of U I cannot be feasible
for all j ≥ 1.
(c) Finally, consider the case in which the inequality ciφs−r > (i− k − kd +m)
is the only one that is violated at (i, i+ r)th entry of U I . Therefore, ciφs ≥
ka − r > ciφs−1 ⇒ ka − r + 1 > ci+1φs−1, and consequently, there is no
feasible solution in (i + j, i + r)th entry of U I for all j ≥ 1. Therefore, any
column of U I contains at most one feasible (non-zero) entry.
Corollary 3. At most one cell in a column of U I is feasible.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the arguments for Lemma 3 (c).
Theorem 2. v∗, α∗ can be computed in O(k) time.
Proof. From Lemma 3 and Corollary 3, we can conclude that from a current cell
(i, j) in U I , one needs to search either in cell (i+1, j) or cell (i, j+1) to find the
next feasible element. Therefore, a linear search (O(k)) that alternates between
rows and columns leads to the cell containing the maximum element.
Next, we show that all feasible entries in U II can be computed in O(k) time.
For each row i, there is at most one r which satisfies ciφs ≥ ka − r > ciφs − 1
in (20). Therefore, for each row in U II , we can find the feasible cell in constant
time. This implies that all feasible entries in U II can be computed in O(k) time,
and a linear or a logarithmic search among the feasible entries provides the
maximum element. uunionsq
Algorithm 1 gives v∗, α∗ and active targets for the attacker and the defender
in linear time.
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Algorithm 1 Computation of the value, and active targets
1: Input: φ1, . . . , φm and ka, kd
2: Output: v∗, α∗,Ua,Ud
3: Construct U based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
4: i1 ← 1
5: for j = 1 : m− kd do
6: for i = i1 : j do
7: if ciφs ≥ ka − r > ciφs−1 then
8: if ciφ− s− r > i− k − kd +m then
9: Ui,i+r =
∑s−1
l=s−r φl +
(ka−r)i−k−kd+m
ci
,
10: end if
11: i1 ← i
12: return i
13: else if ka − r > ciφs then
14: i1 ← i
15: return i
16: else
17: Ui,i+r = 0
18: i1 ← i
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
22: for i = 1 : k do
23: find r such that ciφs ≥ ka − r > ciφs − 1
24: if ciφs−r ≤ i− k − kd +m, and ciφs ≥ ka − r > ciφs − 1 then
25: Ui,i+r = (ka − r − ci−1φs)φs−r +∑s−1l=s−r+1 φl + (i− k − kd +m)φs
26: else
27: Ui,i+r = 0
28: end if
29: end for
30: v∗ ← maxUi,j
31: (i∗, j∗)← arg maxUi,j
32: Ua ← {k − j∗ + 1, . . . ,m}
33: Ud ← {k − i∗ + 1, . . . ,m}
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5 Dual Analysis: Structural Properties of the Defender’s
Strategy and Algorithms
In this section, we present structural results for the optimal strategy of the
defender, and present an O(m) algorithm to compute v∗ and its corresponding
optimal strategy. From the definition of v∗, we obtain the following:
v∗ = min
q
max
1≤j≤na
(Aq)j .
where (Aq)j denote the j
th element of Aq. From (1), (Aq)j can be written in the
following form,
(Aq)j =
nd∑
i=1
qiaji =
nd∑
i=1
qi
∑
l∈xj∩yic
φl =
∑
l∈xj
βlφl,
where,
βj =
∑
{i|j∈yic}
qi =⇒ β = M[m,m−kd]q, (21)
where β = [β1, . . . , βm]
T , and M[m,(m−kd)] ∈ Rm×nd is a combinatorial matrix.
Since M[m,m−kd] is a combinatorial matrix,
∑nd
i=1 βi = m − kd. Moreover, from
lemma 1, for any feasible β there exists a feasible q.
The following lemma provides the structure of β∗.
Lemma 4. β∗ satisfies one of the following conditions:
(a) φs−r ≥ β∗sφs = · · · = β∗mφm ≥ φs−r−1, and β∗1 = · · · = β∗s−1 = 1,
(b) φs−r ≥ β∗sφs = · · · = β∗mφm = φs−r−1, and β∗s−1φs−1 ≥ β∗sφs,
and β∗1 = · · · = β∗s−2 = 1,
where 1 ≤ s ≤ m, 0 ≤ r ≤ s− 1, r + 1 ≤ ka ≤ r +m− s.
Proof. Let the sequence {i1, . . . , im} of indices satisfy the following condition:
β∗i1φi1 ≥ · · · ≥ β∗imφim (22)
Note that v∗ =
∑ika
l=i1
β∗l φl.
First, we show that β∗ikaφika = β
∗
ika+1
φika+1 . Assume 1) β
∗
ika
φika > β
∗
ika+1
φika+1
2) there exists an i ∈ {ika , . . . , im} such that β∗i < 1. Since (ei−eika )T∇βv|v∗ < 0
at v∗, we arrive at a contradiction. Now, assume β∗ika+1 = · · · = β∗im = 1. Since∑m
l=1 βl = m − kd and kd ≥ 1, there exist i, j ∈ {i1, . . . , ika}, i > j such that
β∗i , β
∗
j < 1. Therefore, (ej − ei)T∇βv|v∗ < 0, and we arrive at a contradic-
tion. Therefore, β∗ikaφika = β
∗
ika+1
φika+1 . In a similar manner, we can show that
β∗mφm = β
∗
ika
φika .
Next, we prove that ∀i such that β∗i φi 6= β∗mφm, there is at most one β∗j < 1
and β∗j φj > β
∗
mφm, and the rest of β
∗
i ’s are 1. Assume that there are β
∗
j <
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1, β∗k < 1 such that β
∗
j φj 6= β∗mφm and β∗kφk 6= β∗mφm. If β∗kφk, β∗j φj > β∗mφm,
and j > k, then (ek − ej)T∇βv|v∗ < 0, and we arrive at a contradiction. Now,
assume that β∗j φj < β
∗
mφm, and β
∗
j < 1, therefore (ej − ei)T∇βv|v∗ < 0 for all i
such that β∗i φi > β
∗
j φj , which leads to a contradiction.
Next, we prove that β∗ always satisfies one of the conditions in the Lemma.
Let Γ = {i|β∗i φi = β∗mφm}. First, we prove that ∀j ∈ Γ if β∗j < 1 then j + 1 ∈
Γ . To begin with, we assume that β∗j < 1, β
∗
j φj = β
∗
mφm and j + 1 /∈ Γ .
If β∗j+1φj+1 > β
∗
j φj , (ej − ej+1)T∇βv|v∗ < 0, which leads to a contradiction.
Moreover, if β∗j+1φj+1 < β
∗
j φj then β
∗
j+1 < 1 and (ej+1 − ei)T∇βv|v∗ < 0 for
all i such that β∗j+1φj+1 < β
∗
i φi. This completes the proof for the first structure
in the Lemma. Let j = min(Γ ) and βj∗ = 1. Therefore, for any i ∈ Γ , either
β∗i < 1 ⇒ i + 1 ∈ Γ or β∗i = 1, φj = φi. The last condition leads to the second
structure in the Lemma. uunionsq
Similar to the analysis for the attacker, from the above Lemma, we can
compute v∗ and β∗ by examining all possible solutions which satisfy conditions
(a) or (b) in Lemma 4. Let W be a square matrix of dimension m.
Theorem 3. v∗ = min
i,j
{Wi,j}, where entries of W are defined as follows:

Wi,i+r =
(ka−r)(i−kd)
ci
+
∑s−1
l=s−r φl,
for s− 1 ≥ r ≥ 0, r +m− s ≥ ka ≥ r + 1, ciφs−r ≥ i− kd ≥ ciφs−r−1,
Wi,i+r = (i− kd + 1− ciφs−r−1)φs−1 + (ka − r)φs−r−1 +
∑s−2
l=s−r φl,
for s− 1 ≥ r ≥ 0, r +m− s ≥ ka ≥ r + 1,
ciφs−r−1 + 1 > i− kd + 1 ≥ ci+1φs−r−1
Wi,i+r = +∞, otherwise
where, ci =
∑m
j=s
1
φj
.
Proof. First case corresponds to the structure (a) in Lemma 4. In this case,
β1 = · · · = βs−1 = 1. Since
∑m
l=1 βl = m − kd, and βsφs = · · · = βmφm, we
obtain the following expression for βj
βj =
i− kd
ciφj
, j = s, . . . ,m, (23)
where i = m−s+1 and ci =
∑m
j=s
1
φj
. Next, we provide the feasibility conditions
for structure (a). Since 0 ≤ βj ≤ 1, ciφs ≥ i − kd. Moreover, φs−r ≥ βsφs ⇒
ciφs−r ≥ i − kd. Additionally, βsφs ≥ φs−r−1 ⇒ i − kd ≥ ciφs−r−1. Note that
ka-largest terms of βlφl contain at least one term in the set {βsφs, . . . , βmφm}.
Therefore, r+m−s ≥ ka ≥ r+1. By substituting (23) into Wi,i+r =
∑ika
l=i1
βlφl,
Wi,i+r =
(ka − r)(i− kd)
ci
+
s−1∑
l=s−r
φl. (24)
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The second case corresponds to the structure (b) in Lemma 4. In this case,
β1 = · · · = βs−2 = 1. Since
∑m
l=1 βl = m−kd and βsφs = · · · = βmφm = φs−r−1,
we obtain the following:
βj =
φs−r−1
φj
, j = s, . . . ,m, (25)
βs−1 = i− kd + 1− ciφs−r−1, (26)
where i = m−s+1 and ci =
∑m
j=s
1
φj
. Next, we provide the feasibility conditions
for structure (b). Since βs−1φs−1 ≥ φs−r−1, and 0 ≤ βs−1 < 1, ciφs−r−1 + 1 >
i − kd + 1 ≥ ci+1φs−r−1. Note that ka-largest terms of βlφl contain at least
one term in the set {βsφs, . . . , βmφm}. Therefore, r + m − s ≥ ka ≥ r + 1. By
substituting (25), (26) into Wi,i+r =
∑ika
l=i1
βlφl,
Wi,i+r = (i− kd + 1− ciφs−r−1)φs−1 + (ka − r)φs−r−1 +
s−2∑
l=s−r
φl. (27)
uunionsq
Since W is a square amtrix of dimension m, v∗ can be computed in O(m2).
As in the case of the defender, we can show that W can be computed in O(m)
due to sparsity of W (the feasiblity consitions).
Theorem 4. v∗ can be computed in O(m).
Proof. Please refer to the Appendix for the proof.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we address a security game as a zero-sum game in which the
utility function has additive property. We analyzed the problem from attacker
and defender’s perspective, and we provided necessary conditions for the optimal
solutions. Consequently, the structural properties of the saddle-point strategy for
both players are given. Using the structural properties, we reach to the linear
time algorithm, and semi-closed form solutions for computing the saddle points
and value of the game.
There are several directions of future research. One direction is to use the
proposed structural properties to formulate a network design problem to mini-
mize the impact of attacks, which leads to design resilient networks from security
perspective. Another direction of future research is to generalize the results of
this work to nonzero-sum games with different utility functions for attacker and
defender. Finally, we plan to extend our analysis to security games with non-
additive utility functions.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The proof has already appeared in [6]. The proof is by induction. We
assume that the lemma is true for m′ = m − 1 and k′a = 1, . . . ,m − 1. M[m,ka]
can be written as
M[m,ka] =
[
1T 0T
M[m−1,ka−1] M[m−1,ka]
]
. (28)
By separating p into p¯1 and p¯2,
M[m,ka]p =
[
1T 0T
M[m−1,ka−1] M[m−1,ka]
] [
p¯1
p¯2
]
=
[
1T p¯1
M[m−1,ka−1]p¯1 +M[m−1,ka]p¯2
]
. (29)
Second entry of the above matrix can be written in the following form:
α1M[m−1,ka−1]p
′
1 + (1− α1)M[m−1,ka]p′2, (30)
where, p¯1 = α1p
′
1, p¯2 = (1 − α1)p′2. Since we assumed that the lemma is true
for m′ = m− 1 and k′a = 1, . . . , ka− 1, there exists p′1 and p′2 in a simplex such
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that the following hold:
M[m−1,ka−1]p
′
1 =
ka − 1
ka − α1
 α2...
αm
 , (31)
M[m−1,ka]p
′
2 =
ka
ka − α1
 α2...
αm
 . (32)
By substituting the above expressions in (29), we conclude that M[m,ka]p = α,
where p lies on a simplex. In other words, α lies in a convex-hull of columns of
M . In order to complete the proof, we need to show that the lemma holds for
the base cases M[m+1,m] and M[m,1].
Note that M[m,1] = Im×m. Therefore p = α, and
∑m
j=1 pj =
∑m
j=1 αj = 1.
Next,
M[m+1,m]p = (11
T − I)p = α (33)
p = (11T − I)−1α = (11
T
m
− I)α = 1− α. (34)
Consequently, lemma holds for base cases, which completes the proof. uunionsq
B Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Let W a and W b denote matrices of the following form:
W ai,i+r =
{
Wi,i+r satisfying structure (a) in Lemma 4
0 otherwise
, (35)
W bi,i+r =
{
Wi,i+r satisfying structure (b) in Lemma 4
0 otherwise
. (36)
First, note that all feasible entries of W a and feasible entries of W b are
disjoint due to complimentary feasibility conditions (i − kd ≥ ciφs−r−1 in W a,
and i − kd < ciφs−r−1 in W b). Moreover, since ciφs−r ≥ i − kd ≥ ciφs−r−1,
for any s there is at most one specific r which satisfies conditions of W a. This
implies that computation of all feasible entries of W a is in O(m). Therefore, any
row of W has at most one feasible entry of W a.
Next, we show that computing all feasible entries of W b is in O(m). From
the second structure of Lemma 4, for any sˆ, rˆ and iˆ = m − sˆ + 1, if βsˆ−1 > 1
(βsˆ−1 < 0), (i, iˆ+ r)th entry of W is infeasible for all i > iˆ, r > rˆ (i < iˆ, r < rˆ)
since it implies βs−1 > 1 (βs−1 < 0). Therefore, at every entry of W , βs−1
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provides a criteria for which the rest of entries, in the same row and in the same
column are entirely infeasible, and consequently it is not required to check the
feasibility of those entries. In other words, value of βs−1 provides a criteria for
direction of searching for feasible entries of W b. Thus, computing feasible entries
of W b is in O(m). uunionsq
